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I. INTRODUCTION 
The rule handed down by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Hite 
v. Falcon Partners,1 that payment of delay rental alone under an oil and 
gas lease cannot extend the length of the lease beyond the primary term, 
 
* J.D., University of Akron School of Law, 2013; B.A. in Political Science, University of Akron, 
2010. 
 1.  13 A.3d 942 (Pa. Super. 2011). 
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should be adopted throughout the Appalachian region.2  New 
technological advances in drilling techniques have made vast amounts of 
natural gas trapped in the Marcellus and Utica3 shale beds reachable in 
this area.4  The prospect of reaching the gas in these formations has led 
some commenters to refer to the United States as the “Saudi Arabia of 
natural gas.”5  The relatively recent development of leasing of mineral 
rights in states overtop of these formations has resulted in widely 
varying precedent and laws regarding oil and gas leases.6 
This Note will focus on the law of four states: New York, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia.  The Background section of this 
note will give a description of the developments in these states that have 
rejuvenated the relevance of the interpretation of oil and gas leases in 
this region and explain why this is an important area of the law today.  
This section will also reveal the state of the laws regarding delay rental 
payments.  States in this group are organized according to their treatment 
of the issue at hand.  First, New York presents the strongest precedent 
upholding the extension of an oil and gas lease through delay rental 
payments.7  Ohio law provides that a lease terminates at the end of the 
primary term when no well is producing, even if delay rentals continue.8  
West Virginia represents a state that is yet to definitively dispose of the 
issue.9  The Background will conclude with a brief review of the nature 
of the habendum clause of a lease, which is typically the relevant part of 
a lease regarding this issue. 
The next section, the Statement of the Case, will include a synopsis 
of the facts that led to Falcon.  Although the court’s reasoning will be 
more extensively examined in the Analysis section, the Statement of the 
Case will briefly provide the bases of the court’s decision. 
 
 2.  Id. at 948. 
 3.  The Utica and Marcellus shale beds cover much of the same area.  For simplicity, I will 
refer to these states as the Marcellus States.  
 4.  Joseph A. Dammel, Notes from Underground: Hydraulic Fracturing in the Marcellus 
Shale, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH 773, 774 (2011).  
 5.  Marcellus Shale Gas: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Energy and Natural Resources, 
112th Cong. 62 (2011) (statement of Scott Rotruck, Vice president of Corporate Development, 
Chesapeak Energy Corporation, Oklahoma). 
 6.  Unlike many areas of law in the United States, the law of oil and gas leases was not based 
on centuries-old precedent derived from English law.  Martin refers to the way in which oil and gas 
law was established as “largely home-grown, state-by-state, rather than imported.”  Patrick H. 
Martin, Unbundling the Executive Right: A Guide to Interpretation of the Power to Lease and 
Develop Oil and Gas Interests, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 311, 312-315 (1997).  
 7.  Ball v. Ball, 244 N.Y.S. 300, 304 (1930). 
 8.  See infra Part II.B.(2). 
 9.  See infra Part II.B.(3). 
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The Analysis will be broken down into five main arguments in 
support of a uniform law regarding delay rental provisions in leases in 
this area.  First, this section will demonstrate the importance of the 
development of a uniform law in this region.  The next part of the 
Analysis shows why the very nature of the property right transferred in 
an oil and gas lease disfavors the extension of the term by delay rental 
payments.  The third part will deal with the policy reasons for refusing to 
allow delay rentals to extend a lease beyond its primary term.  These 
include recognition in each of these states of an implied or express 
covenant of development in oil and gas leases and public policy 
concerns with finding the most profitable use for property.  Finally, this 
policy argument will conclude with an analysis of the alternatives 
available to the oil and gas lessee and why these alternatives further 
prove that Falcon presents the best model law concerning delay rental. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Surfacing of the Marcellus Shale 
The Marcellus shale formation, which runs beneath New York, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, and even parts of Maryland, 
Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, is not a new discovery.10  However, 
recent technological advances have made this vast source of natural gas 
accessible.11  These advances have made it feasible to use a technique 
known as hydraulic fracturing12 to drill deep down into the Marcellus 
shale formation.13  As a result, oil and gas companies have flocked to 
these states, ready to invest billions of dollars in purchasing oil and gas 
 
 10.  George A. Bibikos & Jeffrey C. King, A Primer on Oil and Gas Law in the Marcellus 
Shale States, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 155, 156 n.2 (2008-2009).  Only small parts of 
Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee overlay the Marcellus Shale.  Id.  Accordingly, these 
states will not be given great attention as their oil and gas laws are not likely to be greatly affected.  
 11.  Id. at 156. 
 12.  Hydraulic fracturing is a drilling technique that is used to extract “oil, natural gas, 
geothermal energy, and even water” from below the earth’s surface.  Hydraulic Fracturing 
Background Information, U.S. ENV’L PROT. AGENCY (Oct. 31, 2011), 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydrowhat.cfm.  The 
drilling method involves drilling down hundreds to thousands of feet below the surface, at which 
point the drilling proceeds horizontally below the surface.  Id.  Chemicals and water are pumped 
into the well at high pressure, causing the shale to break, or fracture.  Id.  Next, a “propping agent” 
is used to prevent the fractures from closing up and allowing the now-free resources to flow out of 
the earth.  Id.  The pressure from the formation then causes the water and chemicals used to create 
the fractures to flow back out of the well, at which point they are disposed of.  Id.  
 13.  Bibikos & King, supra note 10, at 156. 
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rights and tapping into this huge resource.14  Many uninformed property 
owners signed leases just before the boom at low prices and are now 
looking for ways out of seemingly unfair leases.15  Gas companies are 
doing everything in their power to preserve these “lowball” leases.16 
Consequently, these property owners are turning to the courts for 
answers.17 
B.  Differing Perspectives: How Have These States Disposed of the 
Issue of Delay Rental?18 
The states in question have all faced the issue of delay rentals, but 
they have not all come to the same conclusion. 
1. Extension of the Primary Term in an “Or” Lease: New York 
New York has the least-developed oil and gas law among the states 
relevant in the Marcellus discussion.19  Researchers examining New 
York’s oil and gas laws in anticipation of the Marcellus boom have 
referred to the state as essentially “a blank slate as to all significant oil 
and gas lease issues.”20  It is also the only state whose case law explicitly 
allows for the payment of delay rental to extend a lease for as long as 
 
 14.  ConocoPhillips is expected to invest $2 billion in natural gas in 2011; Exxon Mobil and 
Royal Dutch Shell are also investing billions in shale gas products.  Paul M. Barrett, Shale-Gas 
Reserves Have Potential to Reignite U.S. Economy, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 3, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-03/shale-gas-reserves-have-potential-to-reignite-u-s-
economy.html. 
 15.  Michael Rubinkam, AP Enterprise: Lowball Gas Drill Leases Haunt Pa., THE SEATTLE 
TIMES (July 23, 2011, 12:01 PM), 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2015706907_apusgasdrillinglowballleases.html. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See id.  Rubinkam describes the plight of the Beinlichs, a Pennsylvania couple who sold 
the oil and gas rights to their 117-acre parcel to a gas company for two dollars per acre.  Id.  Five 
years later, near the expiration of the lease term, neighbors are receiving up to $7500 per acre as a 
signing bonus.  Id.  The Beinlichs are now suing in federal court to challenge whether their leases 
should continue.  Id.  See also Casey Junkins, Mineral Owners Sue Chesapeake: Claim Company 
can’t Renew Leases for $5 per Acre, THE INTELLIGENCER/WHEELING NEWS REGISTER (May 16, 
2011), http://theintelligencer.net/page/content.detail/id/555132/Mineral-Owners-Sue-
Chesapeake.html?nav=5233 ( describing a class-action lawsuit filed by West Virginia landowners, 
challenging the gas company’s claim that payment of delay rental extends the lease beyond the five 
year primary term).  
 18.  “Delay rental” is a fee paid to the lessor of property under an oil and gas lease for the 
delay in production during drilling and development.  BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 
2010). 
 19.  The issue of delay rentals is barely addressed in New York statutory law.  See New York 
General Obligations Law § 5-333(2) (McKinney 2005), which provides merely a timeline for 
payment of the first delay rental after a new lease is signed.  
 20.  Bibikos & King, supra note 10, at 191. 
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such rental is paid.21  In Ball v. Ball,22 the court enforced a lease with a 
one-year primary term based on the lessee’s payment of delay rental for 
seven years.23  The court limited its ruling to leases which contain the 
“or” habendum clause construction.24  With new attention being given to 
oil and gas rights in New York, this issue is likely to arise (and soon, 
since litigation concerning old leases has already began).25 
2. Established Law: Delay Rental Provisions in Ohio 
For over a century, the law in Ohio has been that delay rental has 
been inadequate to extend a lease beyond a primary term.26  The Ohio 
Supreme Court has based its reasoning on the idea that the time period 
set out in the habendum clause sets the term of the lease, and without 
production at the expiration of this term, the lease terminates.27  The rule 
in Ohio is similar to the law in states with much more developed oil and 
gas law, such as Texas,28 which has the most experience with oil and gas 
leases of any state examined,29 and New Mexico.30 
 
 21.  Ball v. Ball, 244 N.Y.S. 300, 304 (1930). 
 22.  244 N.Y.S. 300. 
 23.  Id. at 303-04.  The habendum clause of the lease in Ball authorized a lease “for the 
‘purpose of mining and operating for oil and gas for the term of one year, and as much longer as the 
rent for failure to commence operations is paid.’”  Id. at 302.  The court construed this clause as an 
“or” clause (discussed infra Part II.C.), and states that “failure to develop does not authorize 
termination.”  Id. at 304.  
 24.  Id. at 304.  See infra Part II.C. for an analysis of the difference between “or” and “unless” 
delay rental provisions. 
 25.  See Wiser v. Enervest Operating, L.L.C., 803 F.Supp.2d 109, 111 (N.D. N.Y. 2011) 
(addressing the failure of a lessee to pay delay rental during the primary term). 
 26.  See Brown v. Fowler, 65 Ohio St. 507, 522 (1902) (holding that a lease that states that the 
lease expires if no well is drilled in two years, unless delay rental payments of one-dollar per acre 
are made in advance cannot extend a lease for as long as such payments are made, but expires when 
no well is drilled at the end of the two year term). 
 27.  Id. at 521.  
 28.  See A. W. Walker, Jr., The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas 
Lease in Texas, 8 TEX. L. REV. 483, 513 (1930) (claiming that Texas law provides that a lease 
cannot continue “after the expiration of the fixed term by the payment of delay rentals” even though 
a literal reading would imply the lease could be continued in this way forever). 
 29.  Pennsylvania was actually home to the very first oil well, drilled in Crawford County in 
1859.  Hite v. Falcon Partners, 13 A.3d 942, 946 (Pa. Super. 2011).  
 30.  Humphreys v. Fletcher, 204 P. 70, 70 (N.M. 1922).  In Humphreys, the lease provided for 
a two year term and stated that it would expire after one year if no well was drilled, unless delay 
rental was paid.  Id.  The payment of delay rental would extend the time for drilling for twelve more 
months, and this lease explicitly stated that further payments “should further defer the drilling for 
like periods.”  Id.  Even with this express provision allowing extension beyond the primary term, the 
New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that the term of the lease supersedes the rental period.  Id.  In this 
case, the term of the lease was two years, regardless of whether the rental period could be extended.  
Id.  
5
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3. Drilling for Answers: West Virginia’s Need for a Rule 
West Virginia has updated its oil and gas statutory law regarding 
delay rental fairly recently.31  In applying this statute, the West Virginia 
Supreme Court has agreed that the legal presumption of abandonment of 
a well is not created when delay rental has been paid,32 as long as this 
payment is agreed to by the lessor and lessee and designed to keep the 
lease in effect or extend its term.33  In Howell v. Appalachian Energy 
Inc.,34 the West Virginia Supreme Court upheld a ruling that wells and 
equipment had been abandoned when no royalties or rentals were paid to 
the lessors over an eight-year span.35  The question is yet to be decided36 
as to whether consistent payment of delay rental beyond the term of the 
lease will extend a lease when the language of the lease can be read to 
allow for such an extension.37  Litigation is already arising which will 
give West Virginia courts a chance to answer this question.38 
Another important aspect of the analysis in West Virginia is the 
state’s recognition of a no-term oil and gas lease.39  In Wilson v. Reserve 
 
 31.  See W. VA. CODE § 36-4-9a (West 2013) (stating that payment of delay rental in the 
absence of production for twenty-four months overcomes the rebuttable presumption that a lease has 
been abandoned).  
 32.  Other instances preventing the creation of such a presumption include a lease for storage 
purposes, interference by the owner of the gas or oil or his lessee, or inability to market the gas or 
oil.  Id.  
 33.  Howell v. Appalachian Energy, Inc., 519 S.E.2d 423, 431 (W. Va. 1999).  
 34.  519 S.E.2d at 431. 
 35.  Id. at 432. 
 36.  This issue has been decided in West Virginia, but not as applied by the statute.  Eclipse 
Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil Co., 34 S.E. 923, 925-26 (W. Va. 1899).  The Court refused to allow 
delay rental to extend a lease, stating a lessee who enters an oil and gas lease with no intent to 
develop the property should not be allowed to pay delay rental and later profit to the detriment of 
the lessor.  Id.  The Court was not kind to the lessees, going so far as to say that the option to 
explore or not “evidences a plain intention on their part not to explore for oil and gas” and 
amounting such activity to fraud and “a blind to deceive the lessor.”  Id.  
 37.  According to the code, the terms of the lease must show that the delay rental is “designed 
to keep an oil or gas lease in effect or extend its term” in order for such payment to extend the lease.  
W. VA. CODE § 36-4-91. In Falcon, the term of the lease was for “(1) year . . . or as long as lessee 
shall continue to pay lessors two ($2.00) dollars per acre as delayed rentals.” 13 A.3d 942, 944 (Pa. 
Super. 2011).  The question is yet to be determined in West Virginia as to whether such language is 
“designed to keep an oil or gas lease in effect or extend its term.”  
 38.  At least one class-action lawsuit is already pending in U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of West Virginia.  Junkins, supra note 17.  This case involves six property owners 
who entered into leases in 2006 for five-dollars per acre.  Id.  These leases provided for a five-year 
primary term, which ended in early 2011.  Id.  The gas company now claims they can keep these 
leases in effect by paying the delay rental payments.  Id.  With gas companies now paying in excess 
of $5,000 per acre and 156 such leases owned by one gas company in one region of West Virginia, 
this case is likely to be the first of many concerning this and similar lease issues.  Id.  
 39.  Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co., 88 S.E. 1075, 1077 (W. Va. 1916). 
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Gas Co.,40 the court upheld a lease that provided for a quarterly rental 
absent drilling and that permitted “said gas company during the term for 
which payments are made to drill or not to drill as it may elect.”41  Six 
years later, the West Virginia Supreme Court went even further, stating 
that a lease with a term for ten years “and as much longer as the rental 
for delay in operating is paid” also constituted a no-term lease.42  West 
Virginia courts will therefore have to determine whether delay rental 
provisions in controverted leases fall under the statute as intended to 
keep the lease in effect, whether they should be regarded as no-term 
leases, or whether to follow the precedent of rulings like Falcon that the 
tendering of delay rental does not extend the primary term of a lease. 
C. The Nature of the Habendum Clause in an Oil and Gas Lease: 
“Or” vs. “Unless” Clauses 
There is no standard form for a habendum clause in leases.43  
Although they differ greatly, some constructions have become fairly 
common.  The primary term in a habendum clause sets out the length of 
time that the lessee has to put the property into production.44  The 
secondary term is usually contingent on the lessee producing oil and gas 
during the primary term, and extends the period of time of the lease, 
often for as long as gas or oil is produced in paying quantities.45 
Delay rental provisions in a habendum clause commonly come in 
one of two forms, the “or” form or the “unless” form.46  Although the 
difference in phraseology is small, the legal significance is great.47  The 
“or” clause refers to a lease in which the lessee has a certain amount of 
time to commence drilling or pay delay rental in lieu thereof.48  The “or” 
clause is a condition subsequent, meaning that when the lessee fails to 
 
 40.  88 S.E. 1075. 
 41.  Id. at 1076. 
 42.  Todd v. Mfr.’s Light & Heat Co., 110 S.E. 446, 446 (W. Va. 1922).  The habendum 
clause continued: “This lease shall become null and void and all the rights thereunder shall cease 
and determine unless one well shall be completed on the said premises within three months from the 
date hereof, or unless the lessees shall pay at the rate of fifty and no dollars ($50) quarterly in 
advance for each additional three months such completion is delayed from the time above 
mentioned for the completion of said well until one well is completed.”  Id. at 447.  
 43.  A habendum clause is the portion of the lease that sets out how long the lease endures.  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 44.  Mohan Kelkar, The Effect of the Cessation of Production During the Secondary Term of 
an Oil and Gas Lease, 22 TULSA L.J. 531, 532 (1987). 
 45.  Id. at 532-33. 
 46.  Walker, supra note 28, at 520-40. 
 47.  Id.   
 48.  Id. at 536. 
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produce or pay delay rentals, the lessor may terminate the lease or waive 
his right to terminate it.49  The “unless” clause provides that a non-
producing lease will automatically terminate at the end of the specified 
time unless the lessee pays delay rental.50 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Hite v. Falcon Partners51 arose from a group of similar leases 
entered into by landowners and a gas company on either December 18, 
2002, or October 30, 2003.52  The habendum clause of each lease 
provided as follows: 
3. Term. Lessee has the right to enter upon the property to drill for oil 
and gas at any time withinone [sic] (1) year from the date hereof and as 
long thereafter as oil or gas or either of them is produced from the 
Property, or as operations continue for the production of oil or gas, or 
as Lessee shall continue to pay Lessors two ($2.00) dollars per acre 
as delayed rentals, or until all oil and gas has been removed from the 
Property, whichever shall last occur.53 
No action was ever commenced for the drilling on the plaintiffs’ 
properties.54  However, the delay rental was paid each year.55  In 
December 2008, after five years without any development by Falcon, the 
plaintiffs sent notice that the leases were terminated and filed the 
action.56  Falcon believed, and argued in the case, that the provision in 
the contract allowed them to extend the lease into perpetuity simply by 
paying the delay rentals.57 
The court refused Falcon’s arguments, holding that these leases 
expired automatically when the property was not in production of oil or 
gas at the end of the one-year primary term.58  By so ruling, the court 
eliminated the possibility that a lease containing a primary term and a 
secondary term could be extended beyond the primary term with 
payment of the delay rentals alone.59  In its concise explanation for the 
 
 49.  Id. at 536-37. 
 50.  Id. at 520-21. 
 51.  13 A.3d 942 (Pa. Super. 2011). 
 52.  Id. at 944. 
 53.  Id. (emphasis added to the delay rental provision). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 948.  
 59.  Id. at 947-48.  The court acknowledges that a lease may be read to create a perpetual term 
when such an intention “is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms.”  Id.  However, it then 
8
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ruling, the Court stated: 
To find as Falcon urges, that it may pay delay rental indefinitely, 
thereby denying Plaintiffs the opportunity to reap the financial benefits 
of actual production, would be contrary to the decisions of our Courts, 
at odds with the presumed intention of the parties in executing the 
leases in the first place, and in stark contrast to the clear opinion of the 
courts of Pennsylvania that the obligation to pay delay rentals is 
intended to “spur the lessee toward development.”60 
Additionally, the nature of the property right granted by an oil and gas 
lease discredited the argument that delay rental alone would extend the 
lease.61  Each of these bases for the decision in Falcon will be developed 
and further analyzed below.62 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has presented the most 
appropriate standard when it comes to the payment of delay rentals.  
While it acknowledges that a perpetual lease is possible, it shuts down 
another way for lessees to extend a lease with just the mere payment of 
delay rental beyond the primary term.63 
A.  The Need for a Uniform Law 
The four states comprising the bulk of the Marcellus Shale 
formation, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia are in 
need of a uniform law governing the ability of delay rentals to extend a 
lease beyond the primary term.64  In order to demonstrate the need for a 
uniform law, we will use a hypothetical lease based on true facts, to 
examine the vastly differing impact a lease may have in these similarly-
 
proceeds to state that there would be no need for a one-year lease term if the parties intended for the 
lease to extend through perpetuity by the payment of the $2.00 per acre delay rental.  Id. at 948.  It 
necessarily follows that in any lease containing a primary and secondary term, delay rentals alone 
will not extend the lease beyond the initial primary term.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 949.  Falcon contended that payment of delay rental created a vested property right.  
Id.  Under oil and gas law, the oil and gas lease conveys an inchoate title to these minerals which is 
only perfected when the property is put into production.  Id.  
 62.  See infra Part IV.  
 63.  Falcon, 13 A.3d at 948.  Falcon reiterates the rule that a lessee cannot postpone 
development indefinitely, even in the case of a no-term lease, showing consistency to the principle 
that a lease cannot be held perpetually by the lessee without development.  Id.  
 64.  See supra Part II.B. for more details regarding the conflicting laws of these states. 
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situated states.65 
1. The Terms and Habendum Clause 
Our hypothetical lease covers a 1,000-acre farm.66  The lease is for 
a term of five years, beginning January 1, 1967, and for as long 
thereafter as the leased premises are operated in the search for or 
production of oil or gas, or as long as the lessee pays delay rentals in the 
amount of one dollar per acre annually, whichever shall last occur.67  As 
further consideration, the lessor is to receive a 1/8 (12.5%) royalty on all 
gas or oil produced from the property.  The lessee has the option to 
cancel this contract by paying one dollar at any time to the lessor.  Using 
these delay rental terms, we will examine the effect that such a lease will 
have on the lessor in Ohio and Pennsylvania,68 West Virginia, and New 
York. 
2. Rags to Riches: Our Farmer Becomes a Millionaire in Ohio or 
Pennsylvania 
Applying the rule that the payment of delay rental alone is not 
enough to extend an oil and gas lease beyond the primary term, the 
farmer may cancel the lease and refuse to accept any further delay rental 
payments.69  Free to enter into a new oil and gas lease, our farmer will 
discover that his property is quite valuable.  Using fairly modest 
numbers by today’s standards, we will assume our farmer negotiates a 
new five-year lease for $5,000 per acre as a signing bonus plus eighteen 
percent royalties on all oil or gas produced from the property.70  Months 
after signing this lease, our farmer will receive a $5 million bonus check; 
money the farmer retains regardless of whether drilling commences 
 
 65.  This portion of the analysis is based on an actual lease executed in 1967.  
 66.  The actual lease covers 960 acres.  For math purposes, we have rounded this number up 
to 1,000 acres. 
 67.  The gas company has been faithfully making the yearly installments. 
 68.  Due to the similarity in the laws of Ohio and Pennsylvania, they will be grouped together 
using the Rule laid down in Falcon. 
 69.  It is important to note the form of the habendum clause used in this example.  The “or” 
clause is used, rather than the “unless” clause.  As previously stated, the “or” clause gives the lessor 
the opportunity to cancel the lease, while leases with an “unless” clause terminate automatically if 
the condition is not met.  If the habendum clause here had been an “unless” clause, the farmer 
would be free to lease the premises because technically the lease terminated by its own terms.  See 
supra Part II.C. 
 70.  See Junkins, supra note 17 (claiming that signing bonuses in West Virginia’s Northern 
Panhandle are as high as $5,000 per acre). 
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within the term of the agreement.71  If drilling does commence and is 
successful, he will reap the further benefits of receiving nearly one-fifth 
of the income from a producing well. 
3. State of Uncertainty: West Virginia 
Under West Virginia law, if the terms of the lease providing for the 
delay rental can be defined as “designed to keep an oil or gas lease in 
effect or extend its term,” there is no way for the farmer to cancel the 
lease.72  Neither the statute nor the case law provides guidance for how 
to determine whether a clause is designed to keep the lease in effect.  
The lease in question uses a common form, similar to the “or” form used 
in Falcon, which states that the lease continues “so long as the leased 
premises are operated in the search for or production of oil and gas, or as 
long as the lessee pays delay rentals.”73  Using the literal meaning of the 
words, it appears that payment of delay rentals could extend the lease 
indefinitely.  It seems highly unlikely that legislators in West Virginia 
intended to create the possibility of a perpetual lease with no production 
requirements, so it will be interesting to see how the law develops in this 
state. 
4. A Fracking Waste: The Disincentive to Drill in New York 
New York’s authorization of a lease which can be extended through 
the mere payment of delay rentals has devastating effects on our farmer.  
Rather than entering a new lease for a multi-million dollar profit, the 
farmer is forced to accept annual $1,000 rental checks for so long as the 
lessee so chooses, even into perpetuity.  Although New York is hesitant 
to allow gas companies to use fracking within the state, its law on this 
issue greatly benefits these companies.74  Gas companies can use the 
“or” form in drafting leases to ensure that a lease will continue forever at 
 
 71.  See Elisabeth N. Radow, Homeowners and Gas Drilling Leases: Boon or Bust?, 83-DEC 
N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 16 (Nov./Dec. 2011) (describing the process by which lessors are commonly 
compensated upon signing an oil and gas lease).  
 72.  W. VA. CODE § 36-4-9a (West 2013). 
 73.  Supra Part IV.A.(1).  
 74.  Hydraulic fracturing in New York has been the subject of great debate.  In 2009, 
lawmakers passed legislation permanently banning fracking, but Governor David A. Paterson 
vetoed the bill, instead placing a temporary ban on fracking until more research could be done.  
Danny Hakim & Nicholas Confessore, Cuomo Moving to End a Freeze on Gas Drilling, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2011, at A1.  Earlier this year, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo announced his support 
for lifting the ban and allowing drilling to commence.  Id.  
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little cost to the company and at a great cost to the individual lessors.75 
Based on the above example alone, there is clearly a need for a 
uniform delay rental law in states dealing with oil and gas leases.  Aside 
from the difficulty of having to know the differing rules in each state, 
gas companies entering into leases are faced with the uncertainty of 
ambiguous and undeveloped laws.  Sometimes, their leases will 
terminate automatically when no gas is produced at the end of the 
primary term, regardless of whether further delay rentals are paid to the 
lessor.76  In another case, payment of delay rental in the absence of 
cancellation by the lessor might extend their rights under the contract.77  
In still other situations, continued rental payments by the gas company 
even when no well is drilled at the primary term will keep the lease in 
full force.78  These differing outcomes will require oil and gas 
companies to not only know the varying laws of the state, but also to pay 
scrupulous attention to court decisions and make certain that they abide 
by each state’s ever-changing laws. 
B. The Nature of the Property Right Transferred in an Oil and Gas 
Lease 
Oil and gas leases are unusual in that they are not technically leases 
at all.  In some jurisdictions, these “leases” actually transfer a property 
right in the oil and gas from the lessor to the lessee in fee simple 
determinable.79  The lease then functions as a way to sever the estate of 
the surface from that of the minerals below.80  The lessor retains 
possession of the surface estate in fee simple, while the lessee takes title 
to the oil and gas in fee simple determinable.81  This interest is a vested 
interest, meaning it does not violate the rule against perpetuities.82  
However, this vested interest is subject to divestment if a stated event 
 
 75.  Over the course of our hypothetical, the gas company will have paid the farmer $44,000 
in delay rental.  The company could hold onto the 1,000 acres for 5,000 years until they will have 
paid the $5 million to the farmer that he would likely receive in a new lease.  
 76.  See supra Part III.B.(2). 
 77.  See supra Part III.B.(3). 
 78.  See supra Part III.B.(1).  
 79.  Walker, supra note 28, at 483 (describing Texas law).  See also Snyder Brothers, Inc. v. 
Peoples Natural Gas Co., 676 A.2d 1226, 1230 (Pa. Super. 1996) (stating that a lease of mineral 
rights in Pennsylvania transfers the land to the lessee in fee simple determinable).  West Virginia 
also recognizes a determinable fee interest in oil and gas rights.  McCullough Oil, Inc. v. Rezek, 346 
S.E.2d 788, 794 (W. Va. 1986).  
 80.  Walker, supra note 28, at 483. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Snyder Brothers, 676 A.2d at 1230. 
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occurs.83  The interest retained by the lessor is known as a possibility of 
reverter, because at the occurrence of the stated event, title reverts back 
to the lessor.84  More simply, the lessor retains full ownership rights to 
the surface of his property, while the gas company owns all the oil and 
gas.  If a certain event occurs as set out in the lease, the owner of the 
surface automatically reacquires title to the minerals without any further 
action.  This is the view in the majority of states.85 
For a practical example of how this interest works, let’s take 
another look at our hypothetical lease from the example above.86  The 
relevant portion of the habendum clause specifies that the lease shall 
endure for “as long thereafter as the leased premises are operated in the 
search for or production of oil or gas, or as long as the lessee pays delay 
rentals in the amount of one ($1.00) dollar per acre annually, whichever 
shall last occur.”87  In jurisdictions recognizing an oil and gas lease as a 
fee simple determinable, the stated event which would divest the interest 
of the lessees is the cessation of production or the cessation of rental 
payments.  Therefore, as soon as rental payments stop in the primary 
term or the production or search for gas stops during the secondary term, 
the lease terminates automatically without any action necessary by either 
party. 
The question necessarily arises as one examines this fee simple 
determinable classification of the interest transferred in an oil and gas 
lease as to whether the outcome in Falcon was correct.  If a lessee 
acquires vested property rights in fee simple determinable, and the 
contract expressly states that the interest will continue as long as delay 
rentals are paid, should not payment of annual delay rentals prevent title 
from reverting back to the lessor?  At least one jurisdiction, Texas, 
applying this law has come up with an interesting, albeit faulty, 
solution—that the purpose of an oil and gas lease (to explore for, 
develop, and produce gas or oil) constitutes a special limitation on the 
estate.88  Classification of a limiting clause as a special limitation means 
 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Bibikos & King, supra note 10, at 172.  For more information about the states that 
classify an oil and gas interest as a fee simple determinable, see id. at 159, n. 15. 
 86.  See supra Part IV.A.(1). 
 87.  Supra Part IV.A.(1) 
 88.  Walker, supra note 28, at 494 (restating the rule announced in Stephens County v. Mid-
Kansas Oil and Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290 (Tex. 1923) and Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 19 
S.W.2d 27 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1929)); see also McCullough Oil, Inc. v. Rezek, 346 S.E.2d 788, 797 (W. 
Va. 1986) (holding that the “thereafter” provision in a habendum clause constitutes a special 
limitation).  
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that the estate automatically terminates at the occurrence of a specific 
event.89  In other words, the interest transferred is a fee simple 
determinable, but the purpose of the lease becomes one of the stated 
events that will terminate the lease.  The significance of this 
classification is that in the event that the lessee is not engaged in 
exploration, development, or production after the primary term, the title 
to the property automatically reverts to the lessor, even if delay rentals 
are paid.90 
The court in Falcon refused this analysis.  In the case of the lease in 
Falcon, the fee would divest when the last of the following occurred: 
ceasing production of gas or oil, discontinuing the two dollar per acre 
rentals, or removing all of the oil and gas from the property.91  Under a 
literal reading of that clause, it would appear that the fee simple 
determinable would not divest if the delay rentals are paid, even after the 
end of the primary term.92  The Falcon court found that the property 
right transferred to the lessee under a oil and gas lease is not a fee simple 
determinable, but rather an inchoate right, that becomes vested when the 
property is brought into production.93  Failure to bring the property into 
production meant that the property right never vested.94  Under Texas 
law, the court’s decision would be the same, but based instead on a 
violation of a special limitation—the purpose to explore for, develop, or 
produce oil and gas.95 
At least one researcher96 has criticized the Texas Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil and Gas Co.97 Texas’s 
approach of classifying the purpose of an oil and gas lease as “oil and 
gas exploration, development and production” is flawed.  Texas law 
recognizes that there is an implied covenant to develop a leased property 
with reasonable diligence.98  This creates inconsistency among the duties 
of a lessee.99  As a result of these conflicting policies, “there is no duty 
on the lessee to develop the premises at all, but there is a duty on the 
lessee to develop the premises with reasonable diligence.”100  Therefore, 
 
 89.  Walker, supra note 28, at 484.  
 90.  Id. at 485. 
 91.  Hite v. Falcon Partners, 13 A.3d 942, 944 (Pa. Super. 2011). 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 949. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Walker, supra note 28, at 484.  
 96.  Id. at 493. 
 97.  254 S.W. 290, 292 (Tex. 1923). 
 98.  Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 6 S.W.2d 1031, 1035 (Tex. 1998). 
 99.  Walker, supra note 28, at 502. 
 100.  Id.  
14
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when a lessee does nothing after the execution of the lease, the lease will 
be forfeited as a violation of the special limitation.101  However, if the 
lessee begins working on the premises, but violates his duty to develop 
the premises with reasonable diligence, he will be liable for money 
damages to the lessor.102  Clearly, there is a need for a bright line rule 
eliminating the legal fiction that the purpose of the lease imposes a 
special limitation on a lessee’s rights.103 
New York presents a possible solution to the classification of the 
purpose of an oil and gas lease as a special limitation.104  In Ball v. 
Ball,105 New York rejected the idea that the purpose of the lease imposes 
a limitation upon the lessee.106  Instead, the court held that the 
obligations to explore and produce oil and gas are mere covenants.107  
Further, the court states that a breach of an implied covenant in New 
York does not permit the lessor to terminate the lease.108  Accordingly, 
New York precedent supports a finding that a lessee can hold on to a 
lease indefinitely, for both no-term leases109 and term leases using the 
“or” form, simply by paying delay rentals.110 
New York law, therefore, stands on the ground that the obligations 
to explore and develop a lease are covenants, and the breach of these 
covenants does not allow for forfeiture. Damages alone serve as the 
remedy for a breach of the covenants.111  Unfortunately for a lessor, 
stipulated rental payments are the contractual equivalent of damages for 
a breach of these covenants.  So long as these rentals are paid, the lessee 
has no remedy in law or equity.  Perhaps even more discouraging is that 
 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  See id. at 503 (arguing that the Texas Supreme Court should reverse its decision that the 
purpose of the oil and gas lease is for exploration, development and production).  Walker suggests 
that the most appropriate solution is for the court to explain that the purpose of an oil and gas lease 
is actually “to secure a reasonably diligent development of the property for oil and gas.”  Id.  For the 
reasons to be stated below, I believe the approach taken in Falcon of classifying the property 
interest obtained by a lessee in an oil and gas lease as inchoate is the more rational approach.  
 104.  See Ball v. Ball, 244 N.Y.S. 300, 304 (1930). 
 105.  244 N.Y.S. at 304. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 303.  The court went on to distinguish this lease as a “wild cat” lease.  Id.  It defines 
such a lease as different from one where “proven territory exists,” referring to the uncertainty of 
drilling operations in states such as New York.  Id.  
 109.  See id. (stating that the lease in question for “one year ‘and as much longer as the rent for 
failure to commence operations is paid’” contains no definite term and is valid so long as rent is 
paid). 
 110.  See id. at 304.  Although the lease in question used an unusual “and” form, the court 
classifies this type of clause as an “or” lease.  Id. 
 111.  Id.  
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failure to pay rentals appears to be grounds only for a suit to recover 
unpaid rentals.112 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has presented us with yet another 
method of analyzing the property right transferred in an oil and gas 
lease.  The court in Falcon rejected the idea that a vested right under a 
fee simple determinable is created when an oil and gas lease is 
executed.113  Instead, the Superior Court states that the initial title 
conveyed in an oil and gas lease is for the purpose of exploration only.114  
Execution of the oil and gas lease creates an inchoate title, which vests 
only when the property is brought into production.115  Only at this point 
is a fee simple determinable created.116 
States seeking a legal basis for deciding that oil and gas leases may 
not be extended beyond the primary term by mere payment of delay 
rentals, even when the lease can be interpreted to allow such extension, 
should follow the lead of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Falcon.  
The idea that no title vests in an oil and gas lease until gas or oil is found 
is not a revolutionary concept.117  Classification of this interest as an 
inchoate title, which, upon discovery of oil and gas in paying quantities, 
perfects into a fee simple determinable, preserves the lessee’s property 
interest in the premises while not obliging the lessee to take any 
affirmative action.  If the lessee conducts no exploratory drilling within 
the specified time and pays no delay rental, his title in the oil and gas 
never vests.  If he does pay delay rental throughout the primary term, but 
does not find gas or oil in producing quantities, the lease expires at the 
end of the primary term because no fee simple determinable was ever 
perfected.  If the lessee continues to pay delay rental after the term of the 
lease expires, he is paying for a right he does not possess. 
 
 112.  See id. (stating that a breach of the covenant to develop does not allow for termination). 
 113.  Hite v. Falcon Partners, 13 A.3d 942, 945 (Pa. Super. 2011).  
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Some of the oldest oil and gas precedent in Pennsylvania establishes that title to oil and 
gas is inchoate until gas or oil is discovered: 
A vested title cannot ordinarily be lost by abandonment in a less time than that fixed by the statute 
of limitations, unless there is satisfactory proof of an intention to abandon.  An oil lease stands on 
quite different ground.  The title is inchoate, and for purposes of exploration only, until oil is found. 
If it is not found, no estate vests in the lessee, and his title, whatever it is, ends when the 
unsuccessful search is abandoned.  If oil is found, then the right to produce becomes a vested right, 
and the lessee will be protected in exercising it in accordance with the terms and conditions of his 
contract.   
Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, 25 A. 732, 735 (Pa. 1893). 
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C.  Uniform Adoption of the Rule in Falcon: Policy Allows No 
Alternative 
Although the property right transferred in an oil and gas lease is 
actually a conveyance of the estate in fee simple determinable, or in 
some states, a fee simple determinable whose interest vests upon 
production of gas or oil, there are strong public policy considerations 
which prevent delay rentals from extending a primary term.  Some of the 
strongest policy arguments underlie the reasoning behind the 
development of implied covenants.  Policy considerations also arise 
from the economic advantages of maximizing development of oil and 
gas in the United States. 
1. Implied Covenants 
Oil and gas leases commonly contain several unstated obligations, 
or covenants.118  Usually these involve getting the land to produce gas or 
oil, making the land as productive as possible, and preventing drainage 
of oil or gas under one property resulting from pumping of gas or oil 
from nearby properties.119  These covenants are used in this argument 
mainly as evidence of the general policy surrounding the rights of 
lessors of oil or gas interests. 
a. What is the Implied Covenant to Develop in Oil and Gas 
Leases?120 
In Falcon, the court acknowledged that in the development of 
Pennsylvania law there arose an obligation on the lessee to immediately 
develop the property after the signing of a lease.121  It went on to state 
that “the obligation to pay delay rentals is intended to ‘spur the lessee 
toward development.’”122  This philosophy, which is not unique to 
Pennsylvania, is most commonly referred to as the implied covenant of 
development, the implied covenant to test, or the implied covenant of 
 
 118.  Keith B. Hall, The Continuing Role of Implied Covenants in Developing Leased Lands, 
49 WASHBURN L.J. 313, 319-325 (2010).   
 119.  Id. 
 120.  It is important to note that the implied covenant to develop the property does not arise 
until the property is found to be productive.  Id. at 320.  It is not being contended that the failure of a 
lessee to drill during the primary term of a lease is a breach of the implied covenant of development. 
 121.  Hite v. Falcon Partners, 13 A.3d 942, 946 (Pa. Super. 2011). 
 122.  Id. at 948 (quoting Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 759, 789 (W.D. 
Pa. 2004)).  
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exploration.123  The implied covenant of development is recognized in 
some form by courts in most states.124 
b. The Effect of Delay Rental Provisions on the Implied 
Covenant to Develop 
In order to get around the implied covenant to develop, oil and gas 
companies began executing leases that contained provisions relieving 
them of the obligation to drill immediately by paying delay rental.125  
Commonly, lease terms were used which would give the lessee a certain 
period of time during the primary term of the lease to drill without 
paying rentals to the lessor.126  If the lessee was unable to drill during 
that time, he could pay the delay rental and extend the time to drill for 
another year and each subsequent year that the rental was paid.127  
Courts recognized and accepted the use of delay rental provisions, 
allowing lessees to forego drilling as long as the rentals are paid.128  
However, the court in Lake v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co.129 emphasized that 
delay rental payments were created to prevent a lessor from suing for the 
violation of the implied covenant to develop during the primary term 
only.130 
c. Purposes Served by the Implied Covenants 
Implied covenants in oil and gas leases traditionally serve three 
main purposes: fill in the gaps in incomplete contracts, promote fairness 
and equity, and serve public policy.131  As this covenant applies to the 
 
 123.  Hall, supra note 118, at 319-20.  Some jurisdictions refer to this covenant as the “implied 
covenant of reasonable development” or the implied covenant “to conduct exploratory drilling.”  Id. 
at 314-15.  Often these different covenants have slightly different meanings in different 
jurisdictions.  For consistency, we will refer to this covenant as the implied covenant of 
development.  By using this term, we mean to refer not only to the obligation of the lessee to drill a 
test well or otherwise attempt to find gas or oil on the leased premises, but also on the obligation of 
the lessee to make the land profitable by developing its oil and gas interests. 
 124.  See, e.g., Steelsmith v. Gartlan, 29 S.E. 978, 981 (W. Va. 1898) (holding that allowing a 
lessor to hold onto a lease indefinitely without an obligation to develop the land while others are 
clamoring at the opportunity is “unconscionable, and contrary to both right and justice”); see also 
Mills v. Hartz, 94 P. 142, 143 (Kan. 1908) (stating that a lessee has a duty to develop and explore 
the property within a reasonable time). 
 125.  Lake v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 207 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965). 
 126.  Hall, supra note 118, at 319. 
 127.  Id. at 319-20. 
 128.  Lake, 207 N.E.2d at 664.  
 129.  207 N.E.2d 659. 
 130.  Id.  
 131.  Mills v. Hartz, 94 P. 142, 143 (Kan. 1908).  Hall suggests that the public policy reasoning 
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extension of a lease’s primary term without any development, royalty 
payments, or production, the covenant’s ability to promote fairness and 
equity and serve public policy are most relevant here.  In this section, we 
will examine the notions of fairness and equity behind the implied 
covenants.  The public policies underlying the covenants are examined 
in Section IV.C.(1)(d), below. 
It is impossible for an oil and gas lease to account for all possible 
scenarios regarding a leased property.  Gas drilling is highly speculative 
and uncertain.132  At the time the lease is executed, neither party can 
know the true value of the minerals, if any, that may be produced from 
the premises.133  Oil and gas leases rarely state in explicit terms that the 
intentions of the parties (such as to remove, as quickly and profitably as 
possible, the minerals under the leased estate) constitute limitations on 
the lease.134  Instead, the lease will often set out specific grounds for 
which the lease may be canceled and grounds for such cancelation.135  
However, when a lessor enters into a gas lease, his sole purpose is to 
make that land profitable.136  While delay rental might be considered by 
some to be profit, it is the royalty payments to be received from the sale 
of the oil and gas that serve as the true consideration for leases.137  
Accordingly, “principles of fairness dictate that the lessee be obliged to 
make diligent efforts to ensure that the lessor receives the benefit of his 
bargain.”138 
d. The Policies behind the Implied Covenant to Develop 
Landowners whose properties are tied up in unproductive leases 
have an interest in having their leases canceled in order to achieve more 
profitable ones.139  In Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Co.,140 the 
U.S. Supreme Court stated that the object of an oil and gas lease is to 
 
is not widespread or well recognized.  Hall, supra note 118, at 345.  At least one court has 
recognized that such a covenant exists as a matter of public policy.  See Jacobs v. CNG 
Transmission Corp., 332 F. Supp.2d 759, 784 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (holding that it is “a settled matter of 
public policy” that a lessee cannot hold a lease and refuse to operate under it).  
 132.  Gary B. Conine, Speculation, Prudent Operation, and the Economics of Oil and Gas 
Law, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 670, 678 (1994). 
 133.  Id.  
 134.  Walker, supra note 28, at 500-01.  
 135.  Id. at 501.  
 136.  Hall, supra note 118, at 316. 
 137.  Id.  
 138.  Id. (citing Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp, 772 A.2d 445, 454 (Pa. 2001)). 
 139.  Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Co., 292 U.S. 272, 280 (1934). 
 140.  292 U.S. 272. 
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obtain a profit for both the lessor and lessee.141  In cases where delay 
rental would permit an indefinite lease, the lessee would be tying up the 
land for his own profit to the exclusion of the lessor by waiting until a 
time arose when it would be more profitable for him to develop the land.  
This tying up of the land against the rights of the lessor is referred to as 
speculation.142 
“In no event is the lease to be used by the lessee for speculation.”143  
This policy grows even stronger when there is a high demand for the gas 
or oil under the land.144  In Steelsmith v. Gartlan,145 the court opines that 
allowing a lessor to hold onto a lease indefinitely without developing the 
land while others are clamoring at the opportunity is “unconscionable, 
and contrary to both right and justice.”146  Clamoring is an appropriate 
verb to describe the way in which gas companies, such as Chesapeake, 
Exxon, Consol, and Marquette, are doing business, exhibiting a “gold 
rush mentality” in the Marcellus states.147 
With royalty payments being the main consideration for the lessor 
and profitable production of oil and gas serving that function for the 
lessee, the very nature of the oil and gas lease shows a joint expectation 
that the property will be developed by the lessee.148  This arrangement is 
advantageous to the lessor because it allows him an opportunity to make 
his land profitable at no financial risk.149  Due to the impracticability of 
determining the value of oil and gas on a leasehold estate before drilling, 
the royalty-based consideration also benefits the lessee by ensuring they 
do not overpay for a lease that yields no producing wells.150  In other 
words, if the lessee wants to make a profit, he will develop the leasehold, 
and if the lessee makes a profit, then the lessor makes a profit as well. 
Different states use different standards for determining when a 
lessee has violated an implied covenant of development.151  The most 
 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Conine, supra, note 132, at 677. 
 143.  Id. at 678. 
 144.  Steelsmith v. Gartlan, 29 S.E. 978 (W. Va. 1898). 
 145.  29 S.E. at 981. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Bibikos & King, supra note 10, at 156.  
 148.  Conine, supra note 132, at 678.  
 149.  Id.  
 150.  Id.  While in the case of traditional vertical wells drilling a producing well was more of a 
gamble, when it comes to the Marcellus “[g]eoglogists know just where to find the gas-rich shale” 
taking the guesswork out of drilling and eliminating dry holes.  George Hohmann, Marcellus Shale 
Gas Boom Mirrors Gold Rush, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (Nov. 25, 2011), 
http://www.dailymail.com/Business/201111240048?page=2&build=cache.  
 151.  See Bibikos & King, supra note 10, at 161 (acknowledging that most states imply the 
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common standard of conduct for a lessee is the prudent operator 
standard.152  The prudent operator standard is an objective standard 
requiring that the lessee act as a reasonable operator would act in similar 
circumstances to protect the interests of both the lessor and lessee.153  
This standard is the equivalent of a reasonable person standard in tort 
law.154  All of the Marcellus Shale states have acknowledged or adopted 
some form of the prudent operator standard when analyzing whether 
there has been a breach of an implied covenant.155  This indicates that 
each of these states has acknowledged that the purpose of an oil and gas 
lease is to make the land profitable for both the lessor and the lessee. 
e. Balancing Equity’s Distaste for Forfeiture 
Opponents to the rule laid out in Falcon are likely to argue that 
courts of equity generally disfavor forfeiture of a contract.156  Indeed, 
this is a policy echoed by courts, even as concerning certain issues in oil 
and gas leases.157  However, some courts find that oil and gas leases are 
an exception to the rule.158  Instead, these courts hold that leases are 
supposed to be construed “most strongly against the lessee.”159  Falcon 
does not address the issue of forfeiture because of its holding that the 
lessor never obtained a vested fee simple determinable interest in the 
estate by the end of the term specified.160 
In West Virginia, which views the conveyance as a transfer of a 
determinable fee simple title, the law is that the lease “terminates, 
expires, or lapses” rather than being forfeited at the end of the primary 
term due to the nature of the reverter.161  Both of these theories provide 
strong reasons why prohibiting delay rentals from extending the primary 
term of the lease does not violate the policy of courts of equity against 
forfeiture of contracts.  Instead, these theories state that no forfeiture 
 
prudent operator standard). 
 152.  Id.   
 153.  Id. at 161-62.  
 154.  Conine, supra note 132, at 679-80.  
 155.  For a thorough review of the prudent operator standard, see Bibikos & King, supra note 
10, at 161-63.  
 156.  See Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 51 W. Va. 583, 658 (1902); “In general, 
equity abhors a forfeiture.”  Id. 
 157.  See, e.g., Thurner v. Kaufman, 699 P.2d 435, 438 (1985) (stating that forfeiture will not 
be enforced where “a less drastic remedy will satisfy the demands of justice”). 
 158.  Masterson v. Amarillo Oil Co., 253 S.W. 908, 914-15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). 
 159.  Id. at 914.  
 160.  Hite v. Falcon Partners, 13 A.3d 942, 949 (Pa. Super. 2011). 
 161.  McCullough Oil, Inc. v. Rezek, 346 S.E.2d 788, 795 (W. Va. 1986). 
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remedy is necessary in a court of equity, but, rather, that the expiration 
or termination of the lease occurs on its own.  No action by the court is 
necessary except to enforce the terms of the lease itself. 
2. The Economic Incentive: Fracking Our Way Out of a Recession 
It is no secret that the U.S. economy is in bad shape.  Poverty is 
booming and the unemployment rate has skyrocketed.162  Large 
government stimulus packages may have slowed the bleeding,163 but 
development and job creation is the key to healing the broken economy.  
Although the development of the Marcellus Shale is still in its early 
phases, the beneficial impact on the economies of the affected states has 
been astronomical.164  It is no surprise that these drilling operations 
make a huge impact on local economies.  Each gas well costs about $7 
million dollars to construct.165  According to Hohmann, Chesapeake 
Energy Corp., the biggest player in Marcellus Shale, plans to drill 252 
wells in West Virginia in the next year alone.166  At $7 million dollars 
per well, this amounts to over $1.7 billion invested in the state just in 
2012. With over 100,000 wells expected to be drilled in the upcoming 
years and decades in Pennsylvania, the state is likely to see an 
investment of over $700 billion.167  What these huge investments mean 
is that jobs will be created in these states.  In fact, each new well will 
create eleven to thirteen full-time jobs.168  Additionally, some studies 
 
 162.  Emily Garr, The Landscape of Recession; Unemployment and Safety Net Services Across 
Urban and Suburban America, METROPOLITAN POLICY PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS, Mar. 2011, at 2, 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/03/31-recession-garr.  Since 2007, the 
number of unemployed in America has risen ninety-percent.  Id. at 3.  
 163.  The U.S. Government invested hundreds of billions of dollars in tax cuts and job creation 
under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan. David J. Lynch, Economists Agree: Stimulus 
Created 3 Million Jobs, USA TODAY (Aug. 30, 2010, 5:12 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2010-08-30-stimulus30_CV_N.htm.  The huge 
investment seems to have been fairly successful at preventing another massive depression.  Id.  
Between 2.5 million and 3.6 million jobs were created and the unemployment rate dropped back to 
below double digits as of late 2010.  Id.  
 164.  See Cecilia Vega, Sarah Netter, & Maggy Patrick, Boom Town: What Brings Thousands 
of Jobs to One Ohio Town, ABC NEWS (Oct. 18, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/boom-town-
ohio-town-sees-thousands-jobs/story?id=14761821#.Ts_uvfKwV7c (a story about an Ohio town 
with an unemployment rate at fifteen percent which expects to get over 10,000 new jobs created 
paying up to $77,000 per year over the next three years due to Marcellus Shale Drilling).  
 165.  Hohmann, supra note 150.  
 166.  Id.  
 167.  Eliza Griswold, Situation Normal All Fracked Up, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at MM44.  
 168.  Sean D. Hamill, Scope of Marcellus Shale Drilling Job Creation a Matter of Conjecture, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 29, 2012, 10:25 PM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/11058/1128037-85.stm.  
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have shown that the average number of jobs of different types required 
to get a well operating exceeds four hundred.169 
The numbers referred to above address the value of putting a lease 
into production.  These numbers do not account for the investments 
made in purchasing leases.  Due to the fluctuation and uncertainty of 
bonus payments and royalty calculations,170 it is impossible to know just 
how much is being invested in the Marcellus Shale.  What these early 
numbers do indicate, however, is that every unproductive lease that is 
held by the lessee without production harms not only the lessor, but the 
state and local economies as well.  It seems the only person that is not 
harmed financially is the lessee, who holds on to a lease at minimal 
expense and enjoys the privilege of waiting for either a technological 
discovery or a higher price, which would make the asset more valuable. 
This economic incentive has a long-standing basis in oil and gas 
law.  Even a century ago, it was recognized that there is a public as well 
as a private interest in bringing leased lands into production.171  The 
West Virginia Supreme Court stated that forfeiture for delay in drilling 
under oil and gas lease is “essential to private and public interest in 
relation to the use and alienation of property.”172  This public interest is 
even more compelling today, as the drilling of a well into the Marcellus 
Shale is a multi-million dollar investment, which creates jobs and injects 
millions into the state and local economies. 
3. Disfavor of Delay Rental Provisions: The “Paid-Up” Lease 
Oil and gas leases containing delay rental provisions are slowly 
becoming outdated. Modern leases have revealed an increase in the use 
of the “paid-up” lease.173  In a “paid-up” lease, the gas company pays the 
delay rental provisions in a lump-sum payment shortly after the 
execution of the lease.174  This lump-sum payment usually takes the 
 
 169.  Id.  
 170.  Current offers can range anywhere from a few hundred dollars per acre and twelve 
percent royalties to over $5,000 per acre and twenty percent royalties.  Elwin Green, Marcellus 
Shale Could be a Boon or Bane for Land Owners, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 28, 2012, 
10:11 PM), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/business/news/marcellus-shale-could-be-a-boon-
or-bane-for-land-owners-235675.  
 171.  Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 51 W. Va. 583, 658 (1902). 
 172.  Id.  
 173.  This “modern” trend has been growing since at least 1985.  See, e.g., John S. Lowe, 
Negotiating Oil and Gas Leases for the Lessee, 1-SPG NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 6, 56 (1985) 
(identifying the use of “paid-up” leases as a growing trend by oil companies). 
 174.  Kirk B. Burkley, Navigating Oil and Gas Lease Issues, 30-JUN AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18, 
18 (2011).  
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form of a combination of the bonus that lessors often receive for 
granting a lease and the delay rental.175  The “paid-up” lease has gained 
momentum because it prevents the possibility that a gas company could 
lose its rights for failure to make a delay rental payment during the 
primary term.176  The “paid-up” lease essentially removes the obligation 
of the lessee to drill an exploratory well during the primary term or to 
pay delay rental in the absence of such drilling, but leaves intact the 
extension of the lease by production.177 
The increasing popularity of the “paid-up” lease among oil and gas 
companies has practical significance to the argument that delay rental 
provisions should allow a lease to extend beyond the primary term.  
Most importantly, by switching to the “paid-up” lease, these companies 
are acknowledging that the purpose of the delay rental provision is to 
compensate the lessor for the delay in drilling during the primary term 
only.  By the very nature of the “paid-up” lease, the delay rentals for the 
entire primary term are lumped together and reflect consideration paid 
for the privilege of not drilling during the primary term.178 
In turn, oil and gas companies who have switched from the old 
delay rental payments to the “paid-up” lease would not have been 
willing to give up the right to continue a lease beyond the primary term 
by paying delay rentals.  If this had been the intent, then the new “paid-
up” leases would not limit the power of the bonus payment to 
consideration for the delay during the primary term alone.  Instead, the 
terms of theses leases would allow them to continue indefinitely with the 
payment of subsequent rentals.  The rational assumption that arises from 
the actions of oil and gas companies in switching to “paid-up” leases is 
that they never intended that delay rental would hold a non-producing 
lease property indefinitely. 
D. Alternatives Available to the Lessee to Prevent Expiration of a 
Lease 
Oil and gas companies certainly would prefer to hold onto a leased 
property forever without drilling, in the hopes that someday new 
discoveries or technologies would make development of the property 
feasible and profitable.  They certainly would be opposed to an explicit 
 
 175.  Hall, supra note 118, at n. 61. 
 176.  Lowe, supra note 173, at 56.  
 177.  For an example of a “paid-up” lease, see Nancy Saint-Paul, Paid-up Oil and Gas Lease, 5 
SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 59:6 (3d ed. 2011). 
 178.  See generally id.  
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uniform law that would unconditionally limit the length of an oil and gas 
lease to the primary term unless the production requirements are 
satisfied.  However, these profit-driven motives are not justified when 
these companies have the tools and expertise necessary to prevent 
ambiguity in leases and ensure their opportunity to remove minerals 
from the premises beyond the initial term of the lease without violating 
the rights of the lessors.  Specifically, oil and gas companies can 
negotiate for lease terms that give them the option of renewing the lease 
at the end of the primary term, ensure that the primary term provides 
them enough time to bring the premises into production, or simply bring 
the property into production. 
1. Renewal Clauses 
It is easy to imagine why an oil and gas company would want to 
enter into a lease even if the company believes it would be impossible to 
drill on the property within the primary term.  For the most part, these 
reasons center on competition.  In an area where several companies are 
leasing acreage at skyrocketing prices in a limited drilling area, such as 
the Appalachian region, each company is not only seeking to maximize 
their own acreage, but also to prevent competitors from gaining access to 
the valuable mineral deposits.  In order to maximize their own 
opportunities, it may be feasible for these companies to lease property 
without any intention to drill.  Regardless of what a company’s motives 
may be, the use of an option to renew clause, or renewal option, provides 
a method the company can use to tie up property that they are uncertain 
they can bring to production in the first term.179 
An option to renew clause has been recognized by the Supreme 
Court in Oklahoma.180  In Silk v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,181 the court 
was asked to determine whether the signature of a lessor on an “option 
to renew clause” was procured by fraud.182  The clause gave the lessee 
the option of renewing the lease at the end of the primary term by paying 
the same bonus to the lessor that was paid at the execution of the 
lease.183  Without specifically addressing the validity of the option to 
renew clause, the court found that it was not procured by fraud and 
 
 179.  See generally 49 AM. JUR. 2D LANDLORD AND TENANT § 141 (2012).  This explanation 
focuses on landlord and tenant law.  In fact, there is not much law regarding the use of renewal 
option provisions in oil and gas leases. 
 180.  See generally Silk v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 760 P.2d 174 (Okla. 1988).  
 181.  760 P.2d 174. 
 182.  Id. at 177.  
 183.  Id.  
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upheld the lessee’s exercise of the option.184 
In commercial and real estate law, there are abundant sources of 
law validating the use of renewal provisions.185  It is important to 
acknowledge that oil and gas law is a distinct area of law, so much so 
that academics are reluctant to classify renewal provisions in oil and gas 
leases with other types of renewal provisions.186  Although renewal 
clauses in oil and gas leases are not as established as in other areas of 
law, courts have generally accepted the use of these provisions.187  In 
fact, renewal clauses are now so common that standard renewal forms 
can easily be found on legal databases.188  Based on the acceptance of 
these provisions in other states and areas of law, it is likely that New 
York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia will uphold the use of 
renewal provisions.189 
Renewal provisions in oil and gas leases can be used by oil and gas 
companies to retain their interests in oil and gas leases beyond the initial 
term.  Using this tool, companies that are willing to pay lessors bonuses 
multiple times190 can maximize their production in shale gas formations.  
 
 184.  Id. at 181.  
 185.  See, e.g., Daniel E. Feld, Validity and Enforceability of Provision for Renewal of Lease at 
Rental to be Fixed by Subsequent Agreement of Parties, 58 A.L.R.3D 500 (1974).  This article 
presents just one aspect of renewal clauses addressed in the American Law Reports.  A simple 
search of the A.L.R. with keywords “renewal clause” or “renewal provision” reveals dozens of 
articles dealing with specific aspects of renewal clauses.  
 186.  See Jay M. Zitter, Sufficiency of Provision of Lease to Effect Second or Perpetual Right 
of Renewal, 29 A.L.R.4TH 172, n. 2 (1984) (stating that oil and gas leases are of a “distinctive type” 
and refusing to include them in an analysis of renewal provisions). 
 187.  See Silk v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 760 P.2d 174, 181 (Okla. 1988) (finding that separate 
consideration is not necessary when an option is incorporated into the lease agreement); APC 
Operating P’ship v. Mackey, 841 F.2d 1031, 1033 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that tender of 
consideration for renewal by mail was sufficient though not explicitly authorized by lease).  
 188.  See, e.g., William B. Burford, Extension and Renewal Clause, 7 WEST’S TEX. FORMS, 
MINERALS, OIL & GAS § 11:13 (2011).  
 189.  Courts in each of these states have dealt with renewal provisions in other areas of the law 
and generally approved their use.  See Thaw v. Gaffney, 83 S.E. 983, 984 (W. Va. 1914) (finding 
that provisions allowing perpetual oil and gas leases based on production justify the perpetual 
renewal of a lease for real property); Kern v. Clear Creek Oil Co., 778 N.E.2d 115, 120 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2002) (approving of Ahmed v. Scott, 418 N.E.2d 406 (Ohio App. 1979), which terminated a 
real property lease when lessee failed to timely exercise the option to renew); Hite v. Falcon 
Partners, 13 A.3d 942, 946 (Pa. Super. 2011) (identifying the option to renew as a predecessor to the 
modern habendum clause); American Power Indus., Ltd. v. Rebel Realty Corp., 53 N.Y.S.2d 99, 
100 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (enforcing an option to renew in a commercial lease even though lessee 
was two months late in notifying lessor of his exercise of the option).  
 190.  It is important to note that courts are reluctant to enforce renewal of leases more than 
once.  See, e.g., Howard v. Schildberg Const. Co., Inc., 528 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Iowa 1995) (holding 
that a renewal provision “is satisfied by one renewal, unless further renewals are expressly provided 
for”). 
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Therefore, oil and gas companies that would argue that payment of delay 
rental should extend their leases beyond the primary term can achieve 
virtually the same result by drafting clear leases that allow for a renewal.  
This would preserve the right of the lessee to delay developing property 
for some period of time, while at the same time ensuring that the lessor 
is fairly compensated for any excessive delays.  However, if renewal 
provisions become contrary to public policy,191 these provisions could 
become subject to the same scrutiny that perpetual delay rental 
provisions now receive. 
2. How Long Should the Primary Term Last? 
In examining oil and gas leases, it quickly becomes apparent that 
the length of the primary term varies widely.  In Falcon, the primary 
term was for one year.192  In the hypothetical lease discussed above, the 
primary term was five years.193  It is not uncommon for the primary term 
of a lease to endure for ten194 or even twenty-five years.195 This variation 
brings to mind two important questions.  First, why would an oil and gas 
company agree to a lease term of five, ten, or twenty five years if it was 
possible to have a one year lease term and then have merely an option to 
extend the lease by paying delay rental payments?  This question 
necessarily leads one to wonder how long a primary term should last.  
These issues are addressed in turn below. 
The inconsistency of primary terms of leases entered into by oil and 
gas companies reflects an acknowledgement by these companies that a 
lease expires when the production requirements have not been satisfied 
at the end of the primary term.  It would not make sense for a gas 
company to agree to a primary term of ten years, during which they 
would be required to pay delay rental, when the same result could be 
accomplished by executing a one-year lease.  If production was not 
accomplished during the first year, the company could continue to pay 
delay rental and bind the lessor to the lease as long as the company saw 
fit.  The existence of longer primary terms clearly shows the intent of 
both lessors and lessees that the term of the lease cannot be extended 
absent a prior agreement or production. 
One solution available to oil and gas companies regarding this issue 
 
 191.  See generally supra Section IV.C. 
 192.  Falcon, 13 A.3d at 944.  
 193.  Supra Section IV.A. 
 194.  Peckham v. Dunning, 125 N.Y.S.2d 895, 897 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953). 
 195.  Hunt Trust v. Crowell Land & Mineral Corp., 28 So. 2d 669, 670 (La. 1946). 
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is to base their decisions on how long to make a primary term on the 
realistic likelihood that they can get the land into production by the end 
of that term.  While the original consideration required to execute a 
longer lease will be greater, so will the benefit to both parties.  
Obviously, ensuring that they have adequate time to drill a producing 
well will reduce the risk of forfeiting leased property due to the 
expiration of the term.  Additionally, the longer duration will reduce the 
probability that the oil and gas company will have to pay the lessor 
multiple times for renewal of the lease. 
3. Fulfilling the Object of the Lease: Production in Paying 
Quantities 
It is customary for the habendum clause of an oil and gas lease to 
provide language that extends the lease for the primary term and “as 
long thereafter as oil or gas or either of them is produced from the 
Property.”196  If every leased property was brought into production by 
the end of the primary term, the question of whether delay rental could 
be used to extend the lease would become moot.  While a world in 
which every gas lease resulted in production may be a fairy tale, 
production requirements make this aspiration more of a reality in 
Marcellus Shale states.197  In today’s era of hydraulic fracturing, there 
are many ways in which lessees can satisfy the production requirements, 
or at least prolong the expiration of the lease.198  Chief among these 
methods of producing are commencement clauses, pooling provisions, 
and continuous operations clauses.199 
In some instances, satisfaction of a commencement clause will 
allow a lessee to continue operations after the primary term of a lease 
expires without production.200  The commencement clause, which can 
vary greatly, basically provides that if a lessee commences drilling 
operations within the primary term of the lease, the lease will be 
extended so long as drilling continues.201  In some jurisdictions, merely 
 
 196.  Falcon, 13 A.3d at 944. 
 197.  It is unrealistic to think that every gas well drilled will produce.  Nearly half of all gas 
wells drilled through 1998 resulted in a dry hole.  Thaddeus S. Dyman & Troy A. Cook, Summary 
of Deep Oil and Gas Wells in the United States through 1998, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DEP. OF 
THE INTERIOR 3 (1998), http://pubs.usgs.gov/dds/dds-067/CHB.pdf.  
 198.  See generally Bruce M. Kramer, Keeping Leases Alive in the Era of Horizontal Drilling 
and Hydraulic Fracturing: Are the Old Workhorses (Shut-in, Continuous Operations, and Pooling 
Provisions) Up to the Task?, 49 Washburn L.J. 283 (2010).  
 199.  See generally id.  
 200.  Id. at 296.  
 201.  Nancy Saint-Paul, What Constitutes Commencement of Drilling, 2 SUMMERS OIL AND 
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bringing in materials to begin the drilling process will be enough to 
satisfy the commencement clause, but others require that the drilling 
operations reflect a showing of good faith development by the lessee.202  
Regardless of whether actual drilling is required for commencement, 
carefully drafted leases can afford lessees more time to complete wells 
under a lease. 
Another option available for the lessee is the use of a pooling 
clause.  A pooling clause is part of a lease that allows the lessee to 
combine the acreage of a certain lease with others without the lessor’s 
consent.203  Often, these pooled units are required to be approved by a 
governmental entity before the drilling may begin.204  Pooling provisions 
are especially important in shale drilling due to the huge range of 
acreage that can be reached from a single horizontal drilling site.205  This 
tool can be particularly useful to oil and gas companies because 
production of oil or gas from any portion of the lands pooled together is 
considered production from each of the parcels involved in the unit.206  
Cleverly created units can allow oil and gas companies to maximize 
production on their pooling units while ensuring that landowners entitled 
to royalties reap the benefits of production.207 
 
GAS § 15:19 (3d ed. 2011).  
 202.  Compare Santa Fe Drilling Co., Inc. v. Moore, No. 82 X 15, 1983 WL 2278, at *3 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1983) (holding that lessee that had paid delay rental and conferred with lessor about 
drilling sites could continue operations after the expiration of the primary term although drilling had 
not begun) and Todd v. Mfrs.’ Light & Heat Co., 110 S.E. 446, 447 (W. Va. 1922) (holding that 
drilling which commenced three months before the expiration of the ten year primary term satisfied 
the commencement clause extending the lease) and Henderson v. Ferrell, 38 A. 1018, 1019 (Pa. 
1898) (upholding a jury determination that lessee who entered the property on the last day of the 
primary term and drove a stake into the ground to mark well site and lumber delivery mark had 
commenced drilling operations in good faith) with Gisinger v. Hart, 184 N.E.2d 240, 241 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1961) (rejecting the argument of the lessee under a ten year primary term lease who 
commenced drilling operations four days before the expiration of the term) and Street v. Masterson, 
277 S.W. 407, 407-08 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (holding that employees of lessee who drilled eighteen 
to twenty feet using a rig used to drill water wells with the intent to hold the lease until “hell freezes 
over,” did not commence drilling operations in good faith).  
 203.  Kramer, supra note 198, at 286.  
 204.  Id. at 288. 
 205.  Id. at 291.  Due to the horizontal nature of hydraulic fracturing, one vertical well location 
can result in a well that travels through several tracks.  Id.  Each of these tracts of land contributes to 
the production.  Id.  
 206.  Id. at 293.  Courts are often reluctant to enforce pooled units when the unit is created 
shortly before the expiration of the primary term of leases involved.  Id.  Understandably, 
skepticism arises when it appears that a unit has been created simply to hold leases which are about 
to expire.  Id.  
 207.  It is important to note that many states limit the size of a pooling unit to 640 acres plus a 
ten percent drainage area. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22C-9-8 (West 2013); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. 
LAW § 23-0501 (McKinney 2008); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.202 (West 2013).  
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An operations clause is very similar to a commencement clause, but 
it can be an even broader way for a lessee to preserve its interest in an oil 
and gas lease.208  Kramer acknowledges that the “‘immature’ oil and gas 
jurisprudence” of the Midwest states that make up the shale gas plays 
makes it unclear how these states will interpret operations clauses.209  
However, as long as the clauses are specific about what “operations” are 
required to keep a lease in effect and the lessee moves forward with the 
operations in good faith, the lease should be extended as long as the 
operations continue.210  In this way, a lease may be kept alive even if 
development of a property is only in the planning or preparation 
phases.211 
Used alone or in conjunction, the commencement clause, pooling 
clause, and operations clause provide just three examples of alternatives 
available to oil and gas lessees which help ensure that the lessee can reap 
the fruits of the lease without violating the interests of the lessor.  These 
provisions help to avoid the confounded reasoning by lessees that delay 
rental provisions should be construed to perpetuate leases.  Carefully 
crafted leases that are unambiguous and well-explained to lessors should 
help to clarify the responsibilities of oil and gas companies and the 
expectations of landowners. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Driving through the hills of southeastern Ohio, it is clear that there 
is something important going on.  In the local gas stations and 
convenience stores there is a buzz about economic development and 
jobs.  County roads that are usually empty are packed with trucks with 
Texas license plates, tanker trucks, and tractor-trailers hauling drilling 
equipment.  At night, the usual quiet darkness is interrupted by the bright 
lights of drilling rigs off in the distance and the unusual rumblings of 
machinery.  This is the landscape in the areas overlying the Marcellus 
and Utica shale.  Amid all of the excitement and urgency in accessing 
the valuable resources below the earth, important legal issues have 
arisen.  To landowners tied up in decades-old leases, none of these issues 
are more important than whether they will be fairly compensated for 
their mineral rights. 
 
 208.  See Kramer, supra note 198, at 301 (explaining that in some cases, operations that take 
place off of the leased premises which are intended to help get the leased premises producing can 
satisfy the operations clause).  
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. at 302-03. 
 211.  Id. at 302.  
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While each Marcellus state has some idea of how it will handle 
issues related to delay rental, it is in the interests of both lessors and 
lessees for these states to come up with a definite, explicit, and well-
reasoned conclusion.  Principles of fairness, reflected through public 
policy and precedent led to the decision in Hite v. Falcon Partners that 
oil and gas companies will not be allowed to profit from speculation and 
lack of development of mineral rights to the detriment of the owner of 
the surface.  The very nature of the property right transferred in an oil 
and gas lease aligns with the policy reasoning and provides further 
evidence that the Falcon court came to the right conclusion.  The 
availability of alternative lease provisions and the proliferation of the 
“paid-up” lease serve only to strengthen the argument.  Delay rental 
provisions are intended to compensate lessors for the right to postpone 
drilling during the primary term, and at the expiration of that term, 
further payment of delay rentals will not extend an oil and gas lease. 
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